lations in precarious situations and to victims of disasters and
The decision was made on 8 May to send a team from Europe to conflict. The international movement is represented by 19 naKikwit to set up an emergency intervention. As a result of this tional sections. Each section functions autonomously, but coordecision, shipments of medicines, medical equipment, water, and dination is achieved through a single international council. The sanitation equipment were prepared in Brussels and sent to Kikwit. Belgian section of MSF has been implementing health projects
The content of this shipment was determined by the hypothesized in several districts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo absence of any barrier-nursing supplies in the hospitals and health (DRC) since 1985. On 6 May 1995, the MSF coordinator in centers and the need for an adequate supply of water and disinfectant to deal with an outbreak of an infectious disease likely to be Kinshasa, DRC, received a request for assistance from a physitransmitted through contact with fomites. Some of these supplies cian at a private voluntary organization with which MSF was were standardized kits and some were special purchases that were collaborating. The physician requested help for what was bemade because of the possibility of an EBO hemorrhagic fever lieved to be a concurrent outbreak of bacillary dysentery and (EHF) outbreak (table 1) . viral hemorrhagic fever in the town of Kikwit, DRC.
The diagnosis of EHF was confirmed by the Centers for Disease
Herein, we describe some of the common problems encounControl and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta on 10 May. On 11 May, tered in the African health care setting, certain aspects of the an MSF intervention team-1 physician, 1 sanitation expert, and international response to those problems, and the MSF ap-1 logistician-arrived in Kikwit from Brussels. At that time, 76 proach to assessing and setting up adequate health infrastrucsuspected cases of EHF had been identified, of which 57 had died.
tures during a medical emergency.
Most patients suspected of having EHF were hospitalized in pavilion 3 of Kikwit General Hospital. Although this ward had been earmarked as an isolation ward for the treatment of suspected The Initial Situation EBO cases, it was not physically isolated from the rest of the hospital and not clearly identifiable as a special isolation unit. The Kikwit is a town with an estimated 200,000 inhabitants and two majority of patients were lying on the floor of the ward, and family hospitals (Kikwit General Hospital and Kikwit II Hospital) . The members walked in and out. Bodies were lying unburied in the in-country coordinator of ongoing MSF projects was notified as hospital, and used needles and other contaminated equipment were early as 6 May 1995 of an ongoing disease outbreak, which had not scattered about. The staff (1 physician and 3 nurses), who had been diagnosed etiologically, in Kikwit. Following MSF's initial volunteered to care for the patients, were working without adequate protection. Under these conditions, the risk of becoming infected for both health care providers and family members was judged to be extremely high. Furthermore, the staff had not received salaries tion, where care could be provided under the best available condi- oped, adapted, and tested by MSF during previous emergency
Plastic 100-L garbage bags 100
interventions [1] . The organization of the isolation ward remained
Plastic goggles 50 the same throughout the outbreak.
Rubber kitchen gloves, large 100
Calcium hypochlorite 70% was the main disinfectant used. with HEPA filter); long-sleeved cotton surgical blouses; cotton surgical trousers; long, plastic aprons; rubber boots; rubber kitchen gloves; plastic goggles; and body bags. This protective equipment were reportedly lying unburied in town. No formal surveillance was distributed to the hospital staff and Red Cross volunteers in system had been set up; an appropriate case definition was in charge of body burial. During the first 10 days of the intervention, the process of being established by experts. An information and 99% of the protective equipment that was distributed in Kikwit communication campaign about the outbreak had been initiated in was flown in by MSF. Overall equipment needs were high during Kikwit on 8 May.
the outbreak. The MSF contribution was joined by large amounts A committee of national and international experts, the Internaof equipment and drugs from other international agencies. MSF's tional Scientific and Technical Committee, was in charge of patient contribution (through its donors) in equipment totaled 5342 kg and care and surveillance.
was worth US$47,200. Groups of persons were identified according to their estimated risk of infection so that the supplies could be allocated in a rational
The MSF Intervention way. Risk was estimated on the assumption that certain persons were at higher risk of infection because of their work site and the Relying on previous MSF experience in outbreak control and type of activity they performed (e.g., body burial was considered the needs assessment, the MSF team decided to reinforce the surmore dangerous than interviewing a household). We worked with veillance system and to limit the risk of virus transmission inside CDC staff in Kikwit to establish standard lists of equipment to be health facilities and at the household level.
used by each individual (table 2) . Using this list, equipment was The prospects for control of the outbreak in this urban setting seemed impossible if all patients could not be drawn to one locadistributed to the staff working in the isolation ward, the family S265 JID 1999; 179 (Suppl 1) Interventions to Control EHF Transmission Figure 1 . Layout of isolation ward for care of Ebola hemorrhagic fever patients, Kikwit General Hospital, Kikwit, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1995. Sh.* denotes shower; **HTH denotes calcium hypochlorite.
members staying with the patients, and the staff of the emergency The emergency ward of Kikwit General Hospital and Kikwit II Hospital and 12 sentinel health centers were reopened in Kikwit ward. The Red Cross volunteers in charge of body burial were provided with full protective equipment, body bags, and technical and its surrounding areas to improve surveillance and triage of suspected EBO patients to the isolation ward and to provide emeradvice on safe burial practices.
Once the equipment was disbursed, it was necessary to establish gency care for other medical emergencies. These facilities also received disinfectant, waste-disposal containers, and protective confidence in the local hospital staff and to train them. This was initially accomplished largely by 2 CDC physicians, who cleaned equipment (table 2) . Households identified through the active surveillance system as and rehabilitated the ward and provided hands-on examples to the hospital staff. It is important to note that for the first time, it was being at risk of infection or who refused to bring suspected EBO cases to the hospital were provided with a ''household kit,'' which shown that EBO patients can be cared for safely if protective gear is available and used properly [2] . contained a plastic basin, a water container, rubber kitchen gloves, disposable surgical masks, and chloramine tablets for water disin-MSF staff continued to manage the logistics of the hospital and other health facilities until 8 August. The maintenance of electrical fection. The contents of the household kit were determined by taking into account the fact that relatives of a suspected case were power, disbursal of equipment, provision of drugs, preparation of disinfectant, disposal of medical waste, and other tasks were essenunlikely to use invasive procedures in dealing with the patient and that they needed supplies simple enough to use (e.g., kitchen gloves tial to continuing safe operation of the isolation ward.
On 20 May, the International Scientific and Technical Commitvs. surgical gloves) to guarantee effective use.
Training sessions on the proper use of protective equipment and tee decided to reopen Kikwit II Hospital in order to attend surgical, obstetric, and other non-EBO emergency cases. Indeed, in a town disinfectants were necessary for the staff working in these sites and for the Red Cross volunteers who were involved in body the size of Kikwit, the number of deaths due to such untreated emergencies soon might have outnumbered the deaths due to EHF.
burial. The sessions were organized by the international committee. Participation in the surveillance system in the health centers also MSF worked with other international organizations in the reorganization of the surgical ward of this hospital. The ward was set up, provided an opportunity to review the health workers' knowledge of the case definition and consistent use of the registration and reporting through provision of water and distribution of disposable medical supplies and protective equipment, to ensure the use of safe nursing tools. Suspected cases were referred to Kikwit General Hospital and reported to the International Scientific and Technical Committee. techniques in dealing with non-EHF patients.
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01-05-99 13:41:49 jinfal UC: J Infect Discussion not the ideal setting to solve such a structural problem. A field At the beginning of the MSF intervention, the high risk of virus manual appropriate for the African health care setting has been transmission to patient care providers was well recognized and developed and may provide a means to train staff before another corroborated by the high number of care providers who contracted epidemic and upgrade the level of routine nursing protection [4] . the disease [3]; however, the exact mechanism of transmission Although not directly in charge of either patient care or body was not known. Close contact was considered to be contact with burial, MSF initially provided the staff involved in these activities blood, feces, vomitus, or any other body fluid. Different groups with financial incentives. It was considered impossible to expect were ranked from lowest to highest likelihood of infectious state.
someone to work without appropriate remuneration, especially The medical and paramedical staff was considered to have the when exposed to such high risks. With remuneration, reliable lowest likelihood of being infectious, and suspected EHF cases teams of health care workers who were motivated to carry out the and relatives taking care of patients, respectively, were considered jobs assigned to them were established. The amounts paid were to have the highest and the intermediate likelihoods, respectively, within the range of what was usually paid in DRC. of being infectious. MSF worked on the principle that the more The MSF intervention probably contributed to the reduction of these 3 population groups could be separated, the more the risk transmission of EBO virus. An indirect way to measure this is to of virus transmission through contact with body fluids could be look at the second-generation infections among individuals inreduced. Considering the high infectiousness of the EBO virus, it volved in patient care or in body burial. Before 12 May 1995, 67 seemed mandatory to isolate suspected EHF patients completely health workers had been infected, of which 47 died. After the start from patients with other illnesses. The question arose as to whether of the distribution of the protective equipment and the organization to keep these two units at the same site or in two physically of the isolation ward on 12 May, just 3 cases of EHF were reported separate sites. Keeping the units separate allowed for a better among staff, and none were reported among Red Cross volunteers control of the flow of patients and their families. However, it may involved in body burial [5] . have created confusion among the general population, which had
The delegation of decision-making to the field level, the speed to make a decision where to go in case of illness.
of reaction, and the creativity and collaboration may have played An important issue was the lack of use of aseptic-nursing techan essential role in the effectiveness of the intervention. MSF niques during surgical and obstetrical care and patient care in organization is directed at maintaining these elements through sevgeneral, especially during the care of EBO cases. A direct conseeral means. For example, its director must have solid field experiquence of this was the high transmission of EBO virus in health ence to maintain timely knowledge of field conditions. MSF has care facilities. Health staff needed the necessary protective equipformed an ''emergency pool,'' consisting of several medical and nonmedical professionals with a minimum of 3 years of field expement and antiseptics, and they needed to be trained in correct S267 JID 1999; 179 (Suppl 1) Interventions to Control EHF Transmission rience and with experience in emergency interventions, to be sent If the MSF intervention contributed to the control of the outbreak, it could not have happened without the collaboration and out in such types of emergencies. Between the alert and the initiation of the distribution of protective equipment, only 6 days exchange of expertise, between the national and international members united in the International Scientific and Technical Committee elapsed. Since no guidelines on the control of an EHF outbreak existed, the decision on the actions to be taken were based on the in Kikwit. initial assessment, knowledge of the EBO virus, previous MSF experience in outbreak control, and information on what was alAcknowledgments ready done by other partners of the international committee. Assumptions had to be made (e.g., the sensitivity of the virus to a
We acknowledge the health staff of Kikwit and Bandundu recommon disinfectant, such as chlorine, or the effectiveness of the gion, who were the first to take the brunt of the outbreak and protective equipment that was flown in).
without whom control of the outbreak would not have been achieved. Special thanks go to Christophe Delaude and Geoffroy de Liedekerke (MSF) for initially setting up the isolation ward;
Conclusions
Soeur Guillaumine Clerx and her colleagues of the Annonciate Sister congregation in Kikwit for their invaluable help in setting Key elements in the control of an EHF outbreak are the organizaup the MSF pharmacy; and Philippe Calain and Pierre Rollin tion of an adequate isolation unit for suspected cases and the use (CDC) for their ''hands-on'' involvement in the isolation ward. of proper barrier-nursing techniques, using protective equipment
We are indebted to the staff of MSF's medical and logistics departin adequate quantities.
ment, who through their unrelenting efforts, guaranteed the quality A major issue arising from this experience is the difficulty in and the appropriateness of the protective gear that was provided. controlling any severe disease outbreak in an area where the health care system is impaired and not functioning properly. The lack of correct barrier-nursing techniques in health facilities played a ma-
